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THE RISK OF ADVERSE SELECTION 
AND ITS MANAGEMENT IN THE PROCESS 
OF VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENT
Th e experience of Hungarian investors
Anita Lovas1
Venture capitalists can be regarded as fi nancers of young, high-risk enterprises, 
seeking investments with a high growth potential and off ering professional sup-
port above and beyond their capital investment. Th e aim of this study is to ana-
lyse the occurrence of information asymmetry between venture capital investors 
and entrepreneurs, with special regard to the problem of adverse selection. In the 
course of my empirical research, I conducted in-depth interviews with 10 venture 
capital investors. Th e aim of the research was to elicit their opinions about the 
situation regarding information asymmetry, how they deal with problems aris-
ing from adverse selection, and what measures they take to manage these within 
the investment process. In the interviews we also touched upon how investors 
evaluate state intervention, and how much they believe company managers are 
infl uenced by state support.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Innovation is an oft -mentioned concept today and its use widespread; however, 
not everyone would agree on its meaning. As a concept, its defi nition is constantly 
changing and general debate surrounds its interpretation to this day. Th e foun-
dations of the concept can be linked to the work of Schumpeter, who held that 
innovation always represents a new solution, be it the introduction of a new prod-
uct, application of a new production method, tapping of new sources of procure-
ment, development of a new organisational structure, or entry into a new market 
(Schumpeter, 1980 [1912]). Th e conceptual defi nition in business economics some-
what diff ers from this: here, innovation is the satisfaction of consumer needs to 
a new, higher-quality level (Chikán, 2008). From the commercial and investor 
point of view, meanwhile, innovation is anything that secures a given company a 
competitive advantage (Zsembery, 2012).
1 Th e author owes a debt of gratitude to Edina Berlinger and Judit Karsai for their valuable 
suggestions with regard to earlier versions of this study.
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For an innovation to be successful, three factors need to be present together: the 
idea, the management and the fi nancial capital. On this basis, at least three func-
tions can be distinguished in the innovation process. Th e inventor is the original 
proprietor of a new idea, to whom the idea initially occurs (Kornai, 2011). Th e 
birth of the idea may be preceded by a research process, but it may even come 
about during the ordinary course of business, for example when a worker on the 
production line “accidentally” discovers how to improve the manufacturing pro-
cess. A manager (innovator) is then needed for this to lead to the creation of a 
product which can be sold on the market (Kornai, 2011), who coordinates further 
research and development, ensures the necessary capital, oversees production, 
organises sale on the market, etc. Th e management function can be fulfi lled by 
an individual, a team or an entire company. An external source of fi nancing may 
be necessary to bring an idea to fruition, and for this reason we diff erentiate a 
third player, the fi nancer, who is able to provide this. Th e three functions may be 
sharply separated from each other, managed by diff erent individuals or organi-
sations, or they may work in parallel within the same large company. A typical 
example of an inventor and manager appearing together is at a small innovative 
company for which the lack of funding is oft en the obstacle to growth. Venture 
capital investors are among the vital participants in the innovation process. Not 
only do they play a role in the fi nancing sphere, but – in addition to their fi nancial 
contribution – they also provide professional assistance (management) to the en-
terprises concerned. Figure 1 displays the participants in the innovation process, 
as well as the roles fi lled by each.
Figure 1











If the inventor also carries out management tasks, then I call him simply an en-
trepreneur. If the fi nancer takes an active role in the enterprise’s success, meaning 
that they carry out management tasks in addition to fi nancing, then I call them 
a venture capitalist. Th e relationship between the entrepreneur and the venture 
capitalist is characterised by information asymmetry, which can lead to numer-
ous problems.
Th e scale of information asymmetry varies across individual markets, but in 
certain cases may assume dimensions so serious that even a project that would 
otherwise create value cannot gain fi nancing (credit rationing) (Tirole, 2006).Ad-
verse selection and the danger of double moral hazard both appear in the context 
of venture capital fi nancing. In the present study I will deal with the problem of 
adverse selection, examining what kinds of problems Hungarian investors expe-
rience in this regard during the decision-making process, and how they manage 
these in the lead-up to their investment decisions. On the Hungarian market, 
(non-refundable) state subsidies play a key role – particularly in the case of mi-
cro and small enterprises (Bánfi –Boros–Lovas, 2012). For this reason, I will also 
deal separately with the issue of how, for example, investors’ decision-making is 
infl uenced by the fact that a given enterprise previously received state subsidies. 
In preparing this analysis, I carried out a series of interviews with domestic venture 
capital investors. During my research, I conducted an in-depth interview with a 
member of the board of directors of each of 10 diff erent Hungarian venture capi-
tal investment fi rms. Seven managers of so-called JEREMIE funds took part in the 
interviews, as well as three members of the management of venture capital invest-
ment funds fi nanced purely from private sources. Table 1 reveals the identities of the 
investors whose opinions are refl ected in the results of the interview series.
Table 1
Investors taking part in the interview series
(listed alphabetically)
Name Name of venture capital fi rm Position
József Berecz DBH Investment executive director 
Viktor Déri Prosperitás CEO
Csaba Gaál Core Venture CEO
Viktor Gerő Central-Fund partner
László Hradszki 3TS Capital Partners investment manager 
András Molnár PortfoLion investment manager
Tímea Szilágyi Docler Investments investment director
András Szombati Primus Capital investment director
Péter Tánczos Euroventures chairman of the board
Gábor Vitán Venturio chairman of the board
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During the research, I primarily sought to reject or confi rm the following hy-
potheses:
Hypothesis 1: An entrepreneur is better informed about the feasibility of a 
project and their own capabilities.
Hypothesis 2: Venture capital investors fi lter projects signifi cantly, which is 
time-consuming and can lead to some good projects slipping through.
Hypothesis 3: Th e system of state selection is adequate, and the existence of 
state subsidies is a positive signal to venture capital investors.
Th e interviews with investors were marked not only by the offi  cial positions of the 
given venture capital funds which I came to know, but also by the personal expe-
riences which the investors shared with me. In this regard, several of the subjects 
asked that their names should not appear when individual opinions are cited, 
and consequently I present these investor opinions collectively and anonymously.
2. INFORMATION ASYMMETRY BETWEEN ENTREPRENEURS 
AND INVESTORS
If every participant holds identical information about the feasibility of an inno-
vation and its likely success, then they are equally informed. It may be assumed, 
however, that the initiator of the innovation – the inventor or entrepreneur – is 
better informed about the nature of the idea and its feasibility. In this event, a 
situation of information asymmetry arises, which has a major impact on the im-
plementation and fi nancing of innovations. In this way, the implementation (and 
fi nancing) of an innovative idea oft en gives rise to a problem similar to the classic 
Akerlof (1970) “market for lemons” model (adverse selection). Investors are cau-
tious because, compared to the entrepreneur, they are less aware of the technical 
feasibility of the idea. Th e danger of adverse selection can be particularly acute 
in the fi nancing of an innovative idea at the initial stage (Alam–Walton, 1995; 
Hubbard, 1998). In the course of venture capital investments, however, bilateral 
information asymmetry may even arise, where not only the management of the 
portfolio company holds an information advantage, but the venture capital inves-
tors too. A venture capital investor long active on a certain area of the market may 
have better information about the potential of the market (Strausz, 2009).
2.1. Th e features of a project as hidden information
In the case of early-stage, classic innovation, two types of risk can be distinguished. 
One is the technology risk, which is connected to physical feasibility, and the other 
the market risk, which relates to fi nancial feasibility. Investors agree that the en-
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trepreneur’s information advantage may be genuine in the fi rst case. An inventor 
(for example a physicist) is able to determine whether a given innovation car-
ries technology risks, but within this the scale of the asymmetry is dependent 
on several factors. For instance, the investor can very easily “catch up” with this 
technological information advantage because, on the one hand, they may have 
experience – having already been involved with something similar – while on the 
other hand, they have experts at their disposal. How signifi cant the information 
asymmetry is considered to be in the case of various types of innovation also var-
ies from investment fi rm to investment fi rm. Experience of earlier investments, 
or the nature of the corporate group to which the given company has ties, can 
represent moderating factors. 
For this reason, venture capitalists generally specialise in a select number of sec-
tors (e.g. healthcare, information technology) (Lerner, 2002). In other words, in 
certain peripheral, pioneering areas where venture capitalists have no experience, 
information asymmetry – and thus fi nancing problems (the credit rationing) – 
may prove greater.
From the market point of view, however, this information asymmetry is no longer 
as clear-cut. An investor experienced in a given fi eld might be better informed 
regarding market opportunities than the entrepreneur. While inventors and en-
trepreneurs possess more information about the innovation itself, generally they 
know substantially less about its business feasibility and marketing opportunities 
than the venture capitalist. Consequently, if the inventor in question was work-
ing in “laboratory” conditions prior to the given project, then they do not hold 
an information advantage from the market viewpoint. Moreover, within these 
parameters it is the investor who holds the information advantage. By contrast, 
when an entrepreneur working on the launch of an innovative project has already 
been involved in the given sector for many years, for example as an employee, 
they may possess more market information than the venture capital investor. Al-
ternatively, a company operating for several years may also harbour other hidden 
information. For example, it may happen that a customer accounting for a large 
proportion of revenues has not yet given notice of quitting a long-standing busi-
ness relationship, but the company management is aware of its intention to do so. 
In certain sectors, however, venture capitalists are at an information advantage 
which is not off set by the entrepreneur’s better knowledge of their product. Bi-
lateral information asymmetry does not cancel itself out; in other words, it does 
not resolve tensions, but increases them, so that in the fi nal analysis fi nancing is 
made more diffi  cult.
For a venture capital investor, the product itself is oft en not as informative as 
the person, meaning that from the point of view of the investment decision the 
person actually implementing the project is more interesting. Th e venture capi-
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tal investor is looking for a person to whom they can give money, in whom they 
can trust, and who has the ability to successfully implement a high-risk, high-
return project. It follows that the main question for the venture capital investor 
is whether they can sell what the entrepreneur has invented, and whether there is 
a suffi  ciently good business expert within the enterprise. Whether it is a start-up 
enterprise or a larger company, the quality of management is always the impor-
tant thing to an investor. It is for this reason that there is perceptible information 
asymmetry, since this is information known primarily to the entrepreneur; while 
the company management is aware of its own capabilities, this information re-
mains hidden to an external player.
Th e results of international research confi rm this, as the perception of entrepre-
neurs or management occupies a prominent place among venture capitalists’ as-
sessment criteria (Firgi, 2014).
On the Hungarian market, however, the problem of adverse selection is further 
exacerbated by two factors. On the one hand, there is a lack of adequate teach-
ing in Hungary of how to handle errors, which instead people attempt to cover 
up. By contrast, in America for example, someone who owns up to unsuccessful 
previous eff orts is admired as the kind of entrepreneur who is already aware of 
where things might go wrong (recognising the mistakes which result in failure), 
but who demonstrates, by taking new steps, an ability to move forward. On the 
other hand, within the entrepreneurial class in Hungary, “subsistence start-ups” 
are still a common occurrence. Sometimes, through no fault of their own, some-
one is incapable of a task which the management of a start-up demands and is 
inclined to give up at the fi rst hurdle; and yet a great many people want to launch 
start-ups these days, diluting the start-up community as a whole.
2.2. Conclusion
Th e entrepreneur may hold an information advantage regarding the technical 
feasibility of the project. Innovative start-up companies are less well-informed 
about market feasibility, while hidden market information is more likely to pre-
sent a problem for the fi nancer at companies that have been operating for several 
years. From the point of view of a venture capital investor, however, the capabili-
ties and ambitions of the entrepreneur or management represent the most impor-
tant information – but this information is less well-known to them than to the 
entrepreneur. Th is, however, does not diminish the fi nancing diffi  culties arising 
from information asymmetry.
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3. STEPS TAKEN BY AN INVESTOR TO REDUCE AN INFORMATION 
DISADVANTAGE
Analysis of the process of investor decision-making and the criteria for invest-
ment decisions already stretches back more than 40 years in the specialist lit-
erature (e.g. Wells, 1974; Hoban, 1976; MacMillan et al., 1985; Hall–Hofer, 1993; 
Fried–Hisrich, 1994; Petty–Gruber, 20112). In the Hungarian writing on the sub-
ject, Ludányi (2001a; 2001b) examined the infl uence of capital strength and inves-
tor background on investors’ decisions.
Th ere is agreement in the specialist literature that this is a process of several steps, 
requiring months (or even years), and that only a small proportion of received 
proposals win fi nancing (Cumming–Johan, 2009).
Venture capitalists may use a variety of tools to manage a situation of information 
asymmetry. One is to completely eliminate the technology risk, and to be willing 
to fi nance an enterprise only if there is already a product that meets a specifi c 
market demand and which has already been sold on the market. In this way the 
investor transcends the technological information asymmetry by stepping away 
from fi nancing early innovations, and the credit rationing remains.
Th e second strategy is risk reduction, entailing preliminary investigation of the 
product, project or management. A preliminary investigation and evaluation is 
particularly important in the case of venture capital investments. A venture capi-
tal investor’s expected yield is high, with a willingness to invest in high-risk pro-
jects, but only provided the potential risks are known. In the opinion of investors, 
the goal is not to eliminate all risks but to reach a point where there are no hidden 
risks. Accordingly, the venture capitalist should be familiar with the market for 
the product, its competitive position, etc.
Th e fi rst step in the decision-making process, when potential proposals reach the 
venture capitalist, is the search. According to Tyebjee and Bruno, this is possible 
in three ways: a) entrepreneurs seek out investors directly (the so-called cold call 
technique); b) a partner (venture capital investor, bank) recommends the project 
to an investor; and c) the investor itself carries out an active search strategy (Tyeb-
jee–Bruno, 1984).
Ludányi (2001b) takes the view that from the investor’s point of view there is no 
clear separation between an active or a passive search process (actively seeking 
investment opportunities, as opposed to waiting for the right off er to come in), 
and that generally investors follow a mixed strategy. Th e method of searching 
for opportunities depends on the current stage in the life cycle of the investment 
2 For an overview of 40 years of international specialist writing on the subject, see Petty–Gruber 
(2011)
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company. In the initial stage – due to a less extensive network of contacts – a 
more active search method is typical, but as time passes the strategy shift s in an 
increasingly passive direction. Fried and Hisrich (1994) likewise note that some 
companies seek out investors themselves with proposals, while learning of other 
opportunities through recommendations from others. In the latter case, it is no-
ticeable that the rate of rejection is lower than in the former.
In the opinions of investors I interviewed, numerous channels exist today which 
help potential partners (entrepreneurs and venture capitalists) fi nd each other. 
According to Hungarian venture capital investors, entrepreneurs seek them out 
through publicly advertised media (e.g. e-mail, website), via formal channels (e.g. 
conferences, start-up competitions) or by informal methods (e.g. acquaintances). 
Th e results of our interviews show that the domestic market continues to be char-
acterised by a mixed active and passive search strategy.
3.1. Information memorandum and personal meetings
Th e interviews revealed that as the fi rst step in establishing contact, entrepre-
neurs draw up an information memorandum, which is of key importance from 
the point of view of a fi nancing decision. Based on these information memoran-
da, investors fi lter out more than half of the submitted projects, and on average 
only 30 out of 100 will earn further attention. Due to the large number of projects 
up for consideration, little time is devoted to decisions at this stage, with typically 
only one member of the venture capital fi rm dealing with each submitted project, 
which may then only be forwarded to the other members of the fi rm based on this 
individual’s decision. Both objective and subjective factors may come into play in 
making a decision. A personal meeting may only be set up if a memorandum has 
been prepared which conforms to preliminary requirements. An important ques-
tion relating to the information memorandum is whether the given project fi ts the 
venture capital fi rm’s profi le and advertised strategy. Among the conditions of a 
JEREMIE capital fund are the conditions for entry into a JEREMIE programme.3 
Th ere are certain lines of business in which venture capital fi rms do not like to 
invest; for example retail, where there is no added value, or construction, where 
resoundingly successful projects cannot be implemented. 
We may call this the pre-qualifi cation stage, which the specialist literature con-
fi rms as the stage for screening the fundamental characteristics of a project – such 
as size, geographical location and fi nancing level – which the investor expects from 
the portfolio companies (Tyebjee–Bruno, 1984). At this stage, however, only the 
3  Entry conditions for the JEREMIE programme can be read, for example, in the study by Lovas–
Rába (2013).
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company is examined while the proposal itself is not yet evaluated; typically at this 
point, the business plan is given only a superfi cial inspection (Fried–Hisrich, 1994).
Th e next critical point is the fi rst meeting. If the memorandum suggests the busi-
ness may be interesting, a personal meeting helps to validate and better under-
stand this, as well as to get to know the entrepreneur. Th e venture capitalist will 
gauge whether cooperation is conceivable for a period of 6–8 years, and if a viable 
“chemistry” exists; for example, they will look at how the entrepreneur’s offi  ce is 
furnished, and how they dress, behave and communicate. Given that a venture 
capital investment entails a long-term commitment requiring continuous coop-
eration, it is very important that the parties can work together satisfactorily. 
If the entrepreneur has the requisite experience, or is at least amenable, then the 
parties will agree on how to progress, albeit still without making any promises. 
So begins the negotiation process in order to draw up a business plan on which 
both parties can agree. Th is stage is seen in the specialist literature as the proposal 
assessment and project evaluation stage (Zacharakis–Shepherd, 2001). Th e goal of 
this phase of discussions and conciliation in the process leading up to an invest-
ment is, on the one hand, for the parties to get to know each other better; and, on 
the other hand, to test and jointly revise the business plan. During this process 
the primary focus is on the entrepreneur, with the market only a secondary issue. 
Investors look at the entrepreneurs’ capabilities, how they behave in diffi  cult situ-
ations, and how they and their colleagues manage confl icts.
Th e venture capital investor will now start to familiarise themselves with that 
they have seen in the entrepreneur’s presented materials and during the personal 
meetings. For the investor, the internet is one of the best sources for this these 
days. In addition, investors expect information from the entrepreneur during this 
phase. Typically the task of acquiring this information is carried out by investors 
in-house, and an external expert will only be invited if some special technical is-
sue needs clarifi cation.
3.2. Investment proposal and due diligence
Th e negotiation process, typically based on a decision by the investment commit-
tee or board of directors, culminates in a declaration of intent (term sheet), which 
contains the main conditions for the investment; namely, the sum of money to be 
put in by the venture capital investor and the attached conditions. Th e signing of 
a term sheet is likewise a signifi cant point in the decision-making process, off ered 
to approximately 10% of incoming projects. Before it is issued, investors generally 
request exclusivity for a specifi ed period, meaning that they will only sign a term 
sheet with those who commit themselves to not negotiating with other venture 
capital investors.
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Once the term sheet has been signed, the earlier negotiation process resumes, but 
now the investors not only screen the entrepreneur, but also begin preparations 
for the parties’ joint cooperation. During the term sheet phase, the investors ini-
tiate an offi  cial screening or due diligence procedure. Due diligence is essential, 
as before carrying it out the investor will typically have been guided only on the 
basis of information gathered from the internet, acquaintances and the actual 
entrepreneur. Th e work of due diligence is almost always carried out with the sup-
port of an external team or outside experts, who conduct a thorough screening in 
the legal, fi nancial, business and tax spheres. Th is is also oft en complemented by 
a management audit, where the management’s capabilities and techniques come 
under the microscope. Moreover, in countries where it is more diffi  cult to screen 
entrepreneurs, a background check may also be conducted (to determine, for ex-
ample, the entrepreneur’s integrity or whether there may be shady dealings in 
their past). A check like this is easy to carry out in Hungary (e.g. on Facebook or 
Google), but not so easily in Bulgaria, for example, where a specialised fi rm may 
be required to complete the task.4
Th e issuing and signing of a term sheet, aside from the offi  cial due diligence pro-
cess, is an important milestone because it signals a change in the roles played 
by the entrepreneur and the venture capital investor in the investment negotia-
tions. At the start of the whole process, when introductions take place and initial 
negotiations begin, the entrepreneur outlines the project with the intention of 
convincing the investor to take part. By submitting the term sheet, the venture 
capitalist sets out their fi nancing package with the intention of having the entre-
preneur accept the conditions contained therein. In the preceding stage of the 
process, few entrepreneurs question or take an interest in the whys and where-
fores of the investment structure, and consequently the arrival of the term sheet 
leads to a perceptible wavering on the part of entrepreneurs. It is here that they 
face up to what it actually means for a venture capital investor to fi nance an en-
terprise, what obligations must be undertaken and what strict sanctions may be 
imposed for failure to adequately execute the project. It is not uncommon for the 
entrepreneur to beat a retreat on receiving the term sheet, and for every 10 term 
sheets issued, an average of only seven investment contracts are concluded. 
If the time frame for making contact between the investor and the entrepreneur 
was typically 1–2 days, meaning that entrepreneurs would reckon on a two-day 
response time and another two days to receive feedback and tasks, then the entire 
process leading up to the investment itself would require approximately three 
months. Th e time required for each of these steps, however, is more typically two 
weeks, so that it is very rare indeed for the due diligence process to be completed 
4 E.g. Control Risks Group (http://www.controlrisks.com/)
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within six months. Th e long period is also necessary in order for the parties to 
get to know each other better, since a venture capital investment is “a marriage 
where the parties know they’re going to have a child together, and they also know 
that it will end in divorce” (as one investor put it). Investors should therefore not 
decide within only a couple of days that they need to collect the majority of infor-
mation so quickly.  In the case of a seed and start-up  investment, this period may 
be shorter (3–4 months) because the company has no or only a very brief history, 
meaning that due diligence requires less time and it may not be necessary to in-
volve an external service provider in screening every sphere.
3.3. Conclusion
Venture capital investors apply strict objective and subjective requirements, de-
voting considerable eff orts to screening companies. Th e process is lengthy and a 
signifi cant number of projects do not receive fi nancing. 
4. EVALUATING STATE INTERVENTION FROM AN INVESTOR’S 
VIEWPOINT
State support for the processes of research, development and innovation receives 
a great deal of attention at both the national and international levels. Varying ten-
der or fi nancing opportunities have appeared from country to country, or from 
programme to programme, ensuring numerous possible sources of funding for 
developing companies (Walter, 2014). On the Hungarian market – or more pre-
cisely among Hungarian companies – non-refundable state or EU funding plays 
a dominant role. For example, in the period from 2008 to 2011, close to 50% of 
enterprises carrying out innovations received subsidies, while in 2011 two-thirds 
of company managers planned to submit tenders (Bánfi –Boros–Lovas, 2013). 
Due to the ubiquity of tenders, a venture capital investor has a good chance of 
meeting a company manager who has already applied in a tender before, or who 
has received a non-refundable subsidy. During my research, I thus placed an em-
phasis on gauging the opinions of venture capital investors regarding entrepre-
neurs who had already received such support.
While examination of the impact of state subsidies or intervention has served as 
the basis for numerous research studies, few have approached an investigation of 
the topic based on information asymmetry (Karsai, 2012). Takalo and Tanayama 
(2010), for example, dealt with the issue from the point of view of contract theory, 
demonstrating that the existence of state subsidies is a positive thing because it 
reduces the entrepreneur’s fi nancing defi cit and can serve as another positive sign 
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to investors. Th e latter authors are active in the Scandinavian region and presum-
ably used their experiences on that market as their model. Th e question is: What 
do investors think about state subsidies on the Hungarian market, and does their 
existence contribute to reinforcing or rejecting their investment decisions?
In the view of most investors, for as long as the precise details are unknown, the 
question of whether or not a given entrepreneur has received state support has a 
neutral impact on their decision. It can also be regarded as neutral because the 
criteria for evaluation of tenders at state organisations are diff erent, while oft en 
tender conditions do not match the investment goals of a private investor. For 
example, the state’s goal may be to bring about mass production from a prototype, 
or to provide work for 15 researchers at a research facility, or to generate jobs in 
a socially disadvantaged region. Th e target companies oft en do not fi t the pro-
fi le because the tender requirements confl ict with their investment policy (e.g. a 
JEREMIE venture capital fund may not invest in a fi rm more than fi ve years old, 
while a tender may state that it must have completed at least two business years). 
4.1. State support as a positive sign
On the one hand, the existence of state support indicates to the investor that the 
entrepreneur was able to win a tender. Th is is a positive thing considering that 
tenders require applicants to state the use for which the money is intended. In 
other words, once something has passed a selection process, it means that the 
company’s team has successfully convinced someone of its worth. State sup-
port makes the venture capital investor’s task of analysing easier because they do 
not have to start their evaluation and draw up a business plan completely from 
scratch. At the same time, the winning of state support also means that the com-
pany’s management was able to put together a good tender document and is there-
fore skilled in handling and writing tenders.
Subsidies are typically non-refundable, and so represent a cheap source of fund-
ing. If the company uses this money for useful projects, this is positive. Th e cheap 
funding is also favourable from the investor’s point of view since it constitutes 
leverage (a higher yield can be attained on own resources than without subsidies), 
does not have to be paid back, and is very favourable if it coincides with the com-
pany’s development goals (anyway also a requirement of the venture capital inves-
tor). For example, it is a requirement at certain companies that possible sources of 
funding and potential tender opportunities be explored. But if none yet exist in a 
project, and are only planned, then for the time being the investor will not factor 
these into the project. If the entrepreneur does not receive subsidies aft er all, and 
money runs out during the investment process as a result, then this would be one 
of the worst outcomes for the investor. Consequently, plans are made that omit 
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potential subsidies, so that if this surplus comes in aft er all then it spells very good 
news for the investment (but is still not included among the decision criteria).
Venture capitalists are oft en only willing to invest (avoiding the technology risk) 
if the development process is already complete or if the entrepreneur has already 
performed on the market; in other words, if sales of the product have already 
occurred. Tenders are oft en instrumental in a project reaching this phase. Con-
sequently, state support is a positive sign as it indicates that the project is at an 
advanced stage. Indeed, in this regard we should mention purely state-owned 
venture capital funds (e.g. Széchenyi Capital Fund Management), as well as en-
terprise development bodies (e.g. the Regional Development Holding). In the ini-
tial phase of Hungary’s venture capital sector, the majority of investment projects 
drew on government resources (Karsai, 2002), and until the early 2000s funds 
typically only specialised in major investments. In 1998, the government estab-
lished Small Enterprise Development Financial Ltd., which by 2003 handled 65 
small start-up investments, making it the market leader on the venture capital 
investment market (though it was not termed a capital fund). Even today the state 
maintains a noticeably prominent role in early-stage investments, with almost 
40% of such investments implemented by state-owned companies (Karsai, 2002). 
For this reason, the participation of the state as a previous fi nancer is favourable 
for the venture capital investor since it may mean that the company has already 
completed early-stage developments.
4.2. State support as a negative sign
In itself, the existence of state support also carries risks. Th e winning of tenders 
is conditional upon the undertaking of various obligations which do not always 
conform to the company’s optimal operating policy. For example, a company may 
be obliged to employ at least 10 people when it could operate effi  ciently with an 
optimal staff  of only four; or be required to reach revenue growth in the initial 
stage which cannot be accomplished during the phase of R&D and project imple-
mentation. 
In addition, the entrepreneurial culture may be adversely aff ected if subsidies 
have accounted for a high proportion of revenues. Suspicions may arise if an en-
terprise has hitherto only brought in predominantly state or EU revenues. Sub-
sidies have the strange eff ect on companies of placing them in a partial virtual 
reality. Th is is fi ne (comfortable) for the people working there, but it distances the 
company from the given sector and market environment, and calls into question 
whether it will survive in a market situation. Consequently, state subsidies in an 
enterprise can ring alarm bells if we are talking about a built-in dependence, if an 
entrepreneur is living off  tender funds, or if they are accustomed not to satisfy-
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ing the demands of the market but to merely keeping people in employment or 
disseminating knowledge. One Hungarian entrepreneur expressed a strikingly 
extreme opinion in this regard, saying: “Public money distributed on the basis of 
no matter what clever criteria can also harm enterprises” (Bojár, 2013). Th e state 
behaves diff erently from a market player. It distorts the corporate culture, sales 
strategy, and through this everything up to and including production. Th e mar-
ket is able to provide confi rmation in the long term, but state subsidies isolate the 
entrepreneur from it. When a venture capital investor enters an enterprise, the 
expectation is that the company must be able to diff erentiate itself on the interna-
tional stage, to sell its products abroad and to attain the best possible market posi-
tions. But if the recognition seeps through the company’s culture that it subsists 
not on money from the market but from tender funds, then it will be incapable of 
accomplishing these goals.
4. 3. Conclusion
In the opinion of investors, the assessment of state subsidies depends on a number 
of factors. Overall two of the 10 interview subjects judged that subsidies send out 
negative signals, while three gave them a positive and fi ve a neutral assessment, 
albeit with reservations. On the Hungarian market, state subsidies have had a 
characteristically negative eff ect because they can distort the entrepreneurial cul-
ture and impede an enterprise’s ability to operate under market conditions. At 
the same time, the general opinion of state support refl ects the latter’s impact 
not only with regard to adverse selection but to the moral hazard as well. While 
hidden information (on features of the project and the company, the capabilities 
of the entrepreneur and management) represents the problem with adverse selec-
tion, in the case of the moral hazard it is hidden action (where the work of the 
entrepreneur and management cannot be fully observed and supervised). Dis-
torted behaviour due to the involvement of state subsidies may thus magnify the 
problem of the moral hazard.
5. SUMMARY
Compared to the fi nancing of a traditional business project, the fi nancing of 
innovation has numerous characteristics which can encumber, and oft en even 
thwart, the implementation of innovative projects. One of the main problems is 
the occurrence of information asymmetry between entrepreneurs and venture 
capital investors. Th is range of issues was the focus of the present research, the 
fi ndings of which are as follows.
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Hypothesis 1 was partially confi rmed, meaning that entrepreneurs are at an in-
formation advantage. However, this information advantage applies mainly to 
technical feasibility, and the situation may be reversed when it comes to the mar-
ket feasibility of a project. A clear information asymmetry may come about in 
relation to the entrepreneur’s capabilities and the management of the company 
concerned.
Hypothesis 2 was confi rmed. Venture capital investors make use of their own re-
sources, or involve external experts, in order to thoroughly scrutinize and famil-
iarise themselves with entrepreneurs and projects. A process of several months is 
required in order for a venture capital investor to reach an investment decision.
Hypothesis 3 was partially rejected. On the one hand, conditions of government 
tenders oft en do not coincide with the conditions for market investment. On the 
other hand, in many instances state subsidies distort the corporate culture, so 
that the existence of state support may even send out negative signals. At the same 
time, state support may have a positive eff ect as it may also indicate that the man-
agement has been able to put together a good tender and the company has thus 
secured cheap funding.
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